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Abstract. This study aimed to examine possible spillover effects of a pro-
social default manipulation on subsequent cheating (pro-self) behaviour. 67 
participants completed a laboratory experiment, where they first did a time 
estimation and construction task, then were subjected to either a pro-social 
or a pro-self default donation choice after which they were given the 
opportunity to cheat in a lottery. A significant difference on donation choices 
was found between default groups, such that more participants donated their 
bonus in the pro-social default condition. No significant spillover effect was 
however found between groups. This may be explained by small sample size 
and low cheating behaviour overall. Suggestions for further research are 
larger sample size and a more easily rationalizable cheating task.  
 
 
 The choices people make on a daily basis have great impact on society, although 
they may not always be well thought through or rational. Long-term positive 
consequences are not always guiding decisions, as can be seen in decisions about diet, 
smoking, drinking, savings, environmental behaviour etcetera. One way of helping 
people make better decisions is choice architecture interventions, also known as nudges 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The term “choice architecture” refers to the structure in how 
a certain choice is presented to the person choosing, an intervention which can greatly 
affect which choice he or she makes. There are different types of choice architecture 
interventions, such as incentives, feedback, structure of complex choices and default 
alternatives (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz, 2013). A default alternative is a choice option that 
doesn’t require any active choice. Research shows that if an alternative is presented as a 
default, people tend to choose this option due to minimal effort, implied endorsement 
and reference dependence (Johnson & Goldstein, 2013; Thaler, Sunstein & Balz, 2013).  
 A default alternative is effortless to choose, especially if the active choice of 
another alternative requires filling out and posting a form or some other time-
consuming action. Another type of effort is having to consider different alternatives and 
form an active opinion about which choice is preferable. By accepting the default this 
effort can then be avoided (Johnson & Goldstein, 2013). One everyday example is that 
many people keep the default options for screen saver on their computers (Thaler, 
Sunstein & Balz, 2013). The same effect can be seen in more substantial choices such as 
organ donation, where an opt-out system renders a much higher donation proportion 
than an opt-in system. The effort of making the active choice to opt in as an organ donor 
seems to be too large, even for those having a preference to donate (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003).  
 Furthermore, the implied endorsement of a default alternative means that people 
tend to see the default as a recommended alternative by someone more competent, the 
default gives information about what the right thing to do is. For someone not having a 
strong opinion this may ease the choice (Johnson & Goldstein, 2013). The 
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recommendation is often appreciated, especially if the choice is complicated and 
difficult (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz, 2013). 
 A default choice can also serve as a reference point which frames the options and 
changes the value of them. The person choosing then acts as if he or she has already 
chosen the default value, and compares the other choice/s to the default. Since the 
endowment effect makes people value the things they already have higher than the 
things they do not have, the perceived value of the default option tends to be higher 
(Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, Liu & Rogers, 2011). Since every choice is a trade-off 
between different values there will be some loss and some gain. By changing the 
reference the choice will be interpreted differently, and loss aversion may influence 
what the person chooses.  When, for example, people are to choose whether to save for 
retirement, the default may be either an active choice or auto-enrollment. If an active 
choice is required, the enrollment is framed as a present loss for a future gain. But if the 
default is auto-enrollment, opting out of this is perceived as a future loss and a present 
gain. Loss aversion will make the default seem better regardless of which option it is 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983).  
 Although nudging or choice architecture is well known and has been tried in 
numerous settings, there are still some aspects that are not as well studied. Marchiori, 
Adriaanse and Ridder (2016) suggested that more research is needed when it comes to 
transparency, choice set, consequences and freedom of choice. Nudges are often seen as 
separate interventions, but it is unclear if there are any spillover effects on subsequent 
behaviours. Therefore more research should focus on such potential consequences, if 
nudges are to be recommended as a policy tool for long term positive effects. Such 
spillover effects may include negative spillover due to self-licensing behaviour or 
positive spillover through changes in self-perception or habits.  
 Moral licensing is a phenomenon where a person first acts in a moral way, but 
then acts immorally in subsequent situations (Blanken, van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 
2015). This seemingly inconsequent behaviour is understood as a feeling of having done 
your part, where your previous good behaviour entitles you to act more selfishly later 
(Mullen & Monin, 2016). An individual’s moral behaviour is controlled by self-
perception of one’s own moral standards. A good deed strengthens the feeling of 
morality while an immoral act weakens this feeling. When the self-image is threatened, 
such as after an immoral act, the tendency then is to act morally. When the individual 
has already acted morally however, the self-image is not threatened but strengthened 
and he or she can then justify acting less moral (Truelove, Carrico, Weber, Raimi & 
Vandenbergh, 2014). In a meta-review of moral licensing, Blanken et al. (2015) 
estimated the effect size to be a Cohen’s d of 0.31.  
 Normally, people have a tendency for consistency, which means that they act in 
a similar way in different situations. This would render positive spillover in a nudged 
choice where the individual follows the nudge. These opposite phenomena, licensing 
and consistency, present a contradiction that makes predicting spillover effects quite 
complex. According to a review of recent research, licensing is common when there are 
multiple competing goals, whereas consistency is more common when individuals have 
abstract instead of concrete thinking and when they are connecting their behaviour to 
their underlying values (Mullin & Monin, 2016). Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson and 
Norton (2012) argued that costly prosocial behaviours lead to more consistency while 
cost-free (e.g. hypothetical) behaviours are more likely to render licensing effects. 
According to Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode and Menestrel (2013) an ethical mindset may 
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predict consistency or licensing behaviour, where an outcome-based ethical mindset 
leads to licensing and a rule-based mindset leads to consistency. However, Mullin and 
Monin (2016) could not definitely confirm these explanations in their review, more 
research is still needed.  
 One example of immoral behaviour that may be affected by spillover effects is 
cheating. The opportunity to cheat creates a moral dilemma. While most people want to 
see themselves as honest persons, it’s also a fact that dishonesty often pays off. They 
therefore tend to find a balance between honesty and cheating, where they can receive 
some benefits but still uphold their self-image. Through socialization individuals 
internalize norms and values in society, and form a view of what is acceptable or 
unacceptable behaviour. If they value honesty, dishonest behaviour may lead to a need 
for updating their own moral self-concept, which is unpleasant. This is especially true if 
the behaviour is highly immoral, while smaller immoral acts may be possible without 
affecting self-image (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008). Brown et al. (2011) argued that 
cheating which is easy to rationalize will happen more often than cheating which is 
harder to rationalize. Rationalizing is a form of reinterpretation of immoral behaviour, 
enacted by creating a psychological barrier between behaviour and self-concept. 
According to Ariely (2012) this often leads to self-deception, where people start to 
believe that they would have reached the same result even without cheating.  
 There are different ways to explore cheating behaviour. In this study, a procedure 
adapted from Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) was used. The procedure uses die 
rolling, where participants self-report which number is shown on the die. Different 
numbers give different economic payoff, and there is no incitement to be honest. The 
authors found a high level of cheating in their experiment, where 20% of participants 
cheated fully, 39% were fully honest and a large portion cheated partly. They explain 
these results with lying aversion (making some people fully honest), and maintenance of 
a positive self-image (making some people only cheat partly). Their study did not 
include any spillover but was a separate cheating study only.  
 
 
Aims and hypotheses 
 
 In this master thesis, I aimed to find out if there were any differences in cheating 
behaviour depending on which default alternative participants had received in an earlier 
task. This is in line with suggestions made by Marchiori et al. (2016) that more research 
is needed when it comes to spillover effects of choice architecture interventions.  
 The default manipulation in this master thesis was a choice between keeping or 
donating a bonus, where participants were randomized to either a pro-social default 
(donation) or a pro-self default (keeping the bonus). The procedure to test cheating 
behaviour was as described by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), but with the 
modification that the payoff was not a small payment directly after the study but instead 
a chance to win a larger sum in a lottery later.  
 The chosen method aimed to find differences that could possibly have an impact 
on actual choice architecture decisions. The choices were concrete rather than 
hypothetical and the prosocial behaviours were costly rather than cost-free. If negative 
spillover effects were found, this would imply that long term consequences of default 
manipulations may not be as beneficial as previously thought.  
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 The master thesis is part of a project, Downstream behavioral effects of choice 
architecture manipulations, led by Martin Hedesström and Lars-Olof Johansson at the 
University of Gothenburg and financed by the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg 
Foundation. In the same project there were other studies exploring closely related 
research questions. This was the first lab experiment in the project, and the dataset of 
this study has not been used in any other studies.  
  This study was designed to investigate downstream behavioural effects of a 
pro-social default manipulation. The research question was whether there were 
differences in subsequent cheating (pro-self) behaviour between participants who had 
been subjected to either a pro-social or a pro-self default manipulation.  
 
 The hypotheses were: 
H1: We expect more participants to donate their bonus in the pro-social default 
condition than in the pro-self default condition 
H2: We expect a pro-social default (default donation of bonus to WWF) in choice 1 to 
lead to more cheating in choice 2 
H3: We expect that this effect will be stronger among participants who follow the pro-
social default (as compared to those not following the pro-social default or those 
receiving a pro-self default) 
H4: We expect more cheating among participants who choose to donate in a pro-social 
default condition than among participants who choose to donate in a pro-self default 
condition 
 
 The first hypothesis is the expected default effect. The second and third 
hypothesis build on the expectation of a negative spillover effect, primarily driven by 
the group following a pro-social default. The fourth hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that there will be more licensing and less consistency after a passive choice 
to donate than after an active choice. 
 
 
Method 
 
 
Preregistration 
 This is a preregistered study. The full preregistration can be found at 
osf.io/bp9rw. This means that the hypotheses, procedure and data analysis were all 
planned and registered before the study took place.  
 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited through the participant pool at the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Gothenburg. The pool consists of people who have 
voluntarily chosen to register through an online recruitment system to participate in 
psychological experiments. All participants are 18 years or older. An invitation was 
distributed through this online system. 82 participants signed up, 15 were no-shows and 
67 participated in the experiment. The participants were randomized to either a pro-
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social default condition or a pro-self default condition. Participants were not informed 
about this randomization. 
 44 of the participants (67.5%) were women, 20 of them (29.9%) were men and 3 
had another gender identity (4.5%). The age of the participants was 20-70 years, M = 
34.2, s = 13.2, median age was 31 years old.  
 In the preregistration for this study, the planned sample size was 120 
participants. Due to difficulties recruiting enough participants, combined with the 
almost non-existing cheating in choice 2, the study was discontinued before the 
maximum number of participants was met.  
 
 
Procedure 
 
 
Figure 1. Experiment procedure with three different tasks.  
 
 The experiment took place on campus, in a lab room. Participants received a 
scratch ticket (“Trisslott” which is a scratch ticket from the Swedish state lottery) as a 
payment for their participation. The scratch ticket is worth 30 SEK (approximately USD 
3.5). Depending on their choices in the experiment, they also had the chance to receive a 
cash bonus of 50 SEK (approx USD 6) and a chance to win a raffle with a maximum 
amount of 1500 SEK (USD 180). More details can be seen below.  
 When the participants arrived at the lab, they were asked to sit down at a table 
where they received three numbered envelopes with instructions (see Appendix 1). The 
first was a time estimation and construction task, this was ostensibly the main purpose 
of the study as presented to participants. The second was choice 1 (donating or keeping) 
and the third was choice 2 (cheating or not cheating). The procedure with three different 
tasks is presented in Figure 1. Each participant was left alone in the room after a brief 
introduction, with the test leader waiting outside the room during the experiment.  
 Time estimation and construction task. In the first envelope, participants were 
instructed to build a LEGO car. They were told to first estimate the time it would take 
for them to build the car, and then to ring a bell when they started and when they 
finished building. The time was measured by the test leader outside of the room. 
Time estimation 
and construction 
task
•Estimate the time it 
will take to build a 
LEGO car
•Build the LEGO car
Donation task
•Choose whether to 
keep or donate a cash 
bonus
•Randomized to either 
a pro-self or a pro-
social default
Lottery task
•Roll a die to determine 
the amount of a cash 
price in a raffle
•Unsupervised and 
possible to cheat
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 Donation task. In the second envelope, participants had the choice to either keep 
or donate a cash bonus. They were randomized to either of two conditions – either a 
pro-social default or a pro-self default condition, with two different sets of instructions. 
In the pro-social default condition, the participant is informed that there is a bonus (50 
SEK, approx. USD 6) for their participation that will be donated to WWF. If they do not 
want the bonus to be donated, they can actively choose to receive it themselves by 
removing it from a donation envelope. Donation to WWF is thus the default in this 
condition.  
 In the pro-self default condition, the participant is informed that they will receive 
a cash bonus (50 SEK, approx. USD 6) for their participation. If they instead want to 
donate this bonus to WWF, they can actively choose to do so by putting it in a donation 
envelope. Keeping the bonus is thus the default in this condition. 
Participants were then asked to put the donation envelope in a box and proceed to the 
third envelope. 
 Lottery task. In the third envelope, participants were instructed that there will 
be a cash price awarded (in a raffle) to one participant after the study is completed. The 
amount of the cash price is determined by dice rolling. The participant was asked to roll 
the die (unsupervised) and write down what the die shows. If they win the raffle, the 
amount they will receive is: 
 If 6 is reported, the amount is 0 SEK.  
 If 1 is reported, the amount is 300 SEK (approx. USD 36) 
 If 2 is reported, the amount is 600 SEK (approx. USD 72) 
 If 3 is reported, the amount is 900 SEK (approx. USD 108) 
 If 4 is reported, the amount is 1200 SEK (approx. USD 144) 
 If 5 is reported, the amount is 1500 SEK (approx. USD 180) 
 Since we used a normal (fair) die, each number should be reported by 16.7 
percent of the participants if there are no cheaters. To make cheating possible, the 
rolling of the dice was unsupervised. This means that cheating cannot be established at 
an individual level, but on group level only. This is a procedure adapted from 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).   
 When they had reported the number of the die and their contact information in 
the event that they should win, they were instructed to ring the bell again to finish the 
experiment. They were then given their Trisslott lottery ticket and received a short 
debriefing about the study.  
 Randomization. The randomization was carried out by creating three-digit 
codes (in column A) for all participants in a spreadsheet. The RAND function in Excel 
was used to generate a random number (in column B) in each row. The rows were then 
sorted in ascending order based on column B. After this, the first half of the rows 
(participants) was assigned to the pro-social default condition, and the second half to the 
pro-self default condition (specified in column C).  
 The three-digit codes were used to identify each participant during the 
experiment. The instructions and envelopes were prepared beforehand by a collaborator 
so that the test leader was blinded to which condition each participant was assigned to.  
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Coding and analysis 
 
 All data from the experiments was entered into SPSS for statistical analysis. The 
pro-self default condition was dummy coded 0 and pro-social default was dummy coded 
1. Keeping the bonus was dummy coded 0 and donating the bonus was dummy coded 1.  
 During analysis, the participants were handled as belonging to four different 
groups depending on default condition and donation choices: 
A: pro-self default, not following the default (donating) 
B: pro-self default, following the default (keeping) 
C: pro-social default, following the default (donating) 
D: pro-social default, not following the default (keeping) 
 
Group (default, bonus) 
Group A: (0,1) 
Group B: (0,0) 
Group C: (1,1) 
Group D: (1,0) 
 
 In the cheating test (choice 2), the number 6 on the dice was recoded to 0, all 
other numbers were used as is. This means that the expected mean of this variable, 
without any cheating, is 2.5. 
 Pearson’s chi-square test was used to test for hypothesis 1, and t-tests for 
hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. For exploratory analysis, Pearson correlation and binary logistic 
regression were used. α-level used for significance was p<0.05. SPSS was used for all 
statistical analyses.  
 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
Subjecting participants to a default manipulation may cause some psychological 
discomfort. However, the ethical implications are limited since choice is not restricted. 
All participants were given a short debriefing after the experiment, and were offered to 
receive additional information after the study was completed. Participants were not 
instructed nor encouraged to cheat in the lottery task, any such cheating was the result 
of their own choices. All in all, the study was considered to be ethically acceptable with 
minimal risk of long-term consequences for participants.  
 
 
Results 
 
 
 This study was designed to investigate downstream behavioural effects of a pro-
social default manipulation. The research question was whether there were differences 
in subsequent cheating (pro-self) behaviour between participants who had been 
subjected to either a pro-social or a pro-self default manipulation. 
 In this section the confirmatory analysis of each hypothesis and some additional 
exploratory analysis will be presented.  
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Hypothesis testing 
 
 H1. We expect more participants to donate their bonus in the pro-social default 
condition than in the pro-self default condition. 
 Pearson’s chi-square test was used to compare donation choices in the pro-social 
default condition and the pro-self default condition. The results of the analysis 
confirmed the hypothesis. The participants in the pro-social default condition were 
significantly more inclined to donate their bonus to WWF than participants in the pro-
self default condition (χ²(1, N = 67) = 3.35, p<.05) (one-tailed). The number of 
participants donating or keeping in each group is presented in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Number of participants donating or keeping the bonus in the pro-social and 
pro-self default conditions.  
 
 H2. We expect a pro-social default (default donation of bonus to WWF) in 
choice 1 to lead to more cheating in choice 2. 
 A one-sided t-test was used to test if there was more cheating in the pro-social 
default group compared to the pro-self default group. The results showed that there was 
a somewhat higher mean reported number on the die in the pro-social default group (M 
= 2.8, s = 1.8) than in the pro-self default group (M = 2.3, s = 1.8), but this difference 
was not statistically significant; t(65) = 0.97, p = 0.17 one-tailed.  
 
 H3. We expect that this effect will be stronger among participants who follow the 
pro-social default (as compared to those not following the pro-social default or those 
receiving a pro-self default). 
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 The results of a t-test between participants following the pro-social default (M = 
2.6, s = 2.0) and the rest of the participants (M = 2.5, s = 1.8) showed no differences in 
cheating; t(65) = 0.06, p = 0.95. 
 
 H4. We expect more cheating among participants who choose to donate in a 
pro-social default condition than among participants who choose to donate in a pro-self 
default condition. 
 The results of a t-test between participants following the pro-social default (M = 
2.6, s = 2.0) and the participants following the pro-self default (M = 2.5, s = 2.0) 
showed no differences in cheating; t(32) = 0.16, p = 0.88. 
 
 
Exploratory analysis 
 
 The participants made a time estimation of a construction task, and both the 
estimation and the actual building time were registered. The exploratory analysis aims 
to examine if overestimation or underestimation has any correlation with donation 
choices or cheating behaviour.  
 The time difference between estimated time and actual building time (in 
seconds) was computed into the variable Time_diff. The Pearson correlation between 
Time_diff (M = 180.1, s = 619.3) and reported number of the die (M = 2.6, s = 1.8) was 
calculated. There was no significant correlation between time estimation accuracy and 
cheating behaviour, Pearson’s r(65) = -0.16, p = 0.21 (two-tailed). 
 To examine if there was any correlation between time estimation accuracy (over-
/underestimation) and donation choices, a binary logistic regression was performed. The 
results showed no significant correlation, χ² (1, N = 67) = 2.14, p = 0.11 (two-tailed).  
 
 
Discussion 
  
 The aim of this master thesis was to explore if spillover effects can be found in a 
subsequent choice after a default manipulation. No significant spillover effects were 
found, but there are some explanations that may guide further research.  
 The first hypothesis was that the default manipulation would have a significant 
effect on donation choices. This hypothesis was confirmed by data, which shows that 
the procedure in choice 1 was a default manipulation that had the potential to induce 
spillover effects on choice 2. The default effect is in line with previous research on 
choice architecture interventions (Dinner et al., 2011; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; 
Johnson & Goldstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; Thaler, Sunstein & Balz, 2013). 
The number of participants donating their bonus was significantly higher among those 
receiving the pro-social default compared to those receiving the pro-self default. 
Overall, half of all participants chose to donate their bonus. A possible improvement of 
this experiment could be to include a third group with forced choice, where neither 
donation nor keeping the money is a default alternative but where participants would 
have to actively choose. Mullen and Monin (2016) recommended in their review article 
that studies should include a baseline condition, which could be achieved by having a 
group with forced choice or a group not being subjected to choice 1 at all. 
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 However, contrary to the findings of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), the 
cheating manipulation in this study did not work. The majority of all participants were 
honest and did not report a higher number to gain extra money. One possible 
explanation is cultural differences, there is a strong societal norm in Sweden against 
cheating which could decrease levels of cheating overall (although Sweden and 
Switzerland are usually considered to be quite similar). Another explanation is sampling 
bias, the participants were recruited from a pool which consists of people who have 
voluntarily chosen to register to participate in psychological experiments. This self-
selection could potentially lead to a pool of more pro-socially oriented people than the 
rest of the population, especially since the economic incentives for participating are 
quite humble. These participants might thus be more honest and/or compliant than is 
normally expected. A third potential factor is that the economic gain from cheating was 
neither guaranteed nor immediate. A temporally distant outcome is generally valued less 
than a temporally proximal outcome (Soman et al., 2005). When deciding whether to 
cheat or not, the balance between self-serving value and moral (honest) behaviour could 
hence be shifted towards honesty when the potential gain is distant.  
 The second, third and fourth hypotheses were not confirmed, although there was 
some tendency towards a negative spillover between default conditions. The inability to 
confirm these hypotheses is to be expected when cheating levels are very low and the 
sample size is small. Considering these limitations, the tendency (although not 
statistically significant) may suggest that a spillover effect possibly exists even if this 
study cannot determine whether this is the case. This tendency could only be seen in 
testing the second hypothesis, while there were no differences between groups in testing 
the third and fourth hypotheses. This means that while there may be some potential 
spillover from the default manipulation, this does not seem to be explained by 
differences in the actual choices (donating or keeping), but rather by the default 
condition itself. Some caution is needed when discussing differences between these 
groups though, since cell sizes are rather small. Blanken et al. (2015) suggested that a 
minimum number of participants per cell should be 165 to be able to detect moral 
licensing. Such level of statistical power was impossible to reach within this study due 
to time constraints, costs and recruitment difficulties.  
 Brown et al. (2011) argued that rationalizability of cheating behaviour is an 
important aspect, where easily rationalizable cheating will happen more often. The 
cheating in this experiment is probably not rationalizable enough, while other potential 
cheating behaviours might be. Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) found that cheating was 
less rationalizable when the reward was monetary than when tokens were given, and 
that introducing such a medium offers participants more room to interpret their 
dishonest behavior as acceptable. The monetary prize in this experiment may therefore 
lead to lower rationalizability than if some other type of reward had been given. 
 In addition, the effect of time estimation on donation choices and level of 
cheating was explored. The time estimation task was completed by all participants, but 
was mainly intended to constitute a plausible reason to receive a payment and bonus 
without disclosing the true nature of the experiment. A possible correlation between 
time estimation and pro-social/pro-self behaviour would constitute new knowledge not 
previously observed. The analysis did not show any statistically significant differences, 
though it is possible that there is an effect size smaller than can be detected with this 
number of participants. 
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Limitations 
 
 The two primary limitations to this study were the small sample size and the very 
limited amount of cheating recorded in choice 2. Carrying out an experiment where 
participants partake individually one by one is time consuming, which limits the 
possibility to achieve a sample size large enough to find smaller effect sizes within the 
context of a master thesis. Recruiting problems also emerged, as a smaller part of the 
participant pool than expected chose to sign up for this study. In addition to this, about 
one fifth of participants who had signed up for a time slot didn’t show up at their pre-
booked time, even though they could choose their own time slot through an online 
booking system.  
 Before the study started, 120 participants were planned to be included in the 
experiment. However, the combination of recruitment difficulties and the low level of 
cheating led to a decision to discontinue the experiment after 67 participants. When 
cheating levels are low, a much larger sample size is needed to be able to detect 
potential effects. This decision was made after consultation with my supervisors.  
 
 
Recommendations for further research 
 
 A suggestion for further research is to measure a more common and less 
controversial cheating behaviour, where cheating is perceived as more acceptable and a 
higher level of cheating can be expected. Researchers should aim to find cheating tasks 
where cheating is more easily rationalizable. This will make it easier to examine 
potential differences between groups. To avoid intertemporal discounting, any potential 
economic gain from cheating should be immediate instead of distant. A group with 
forced choice and/or no donation task could also be included, to create a baseline 
condition. With these changes, there is a better chance of finding spillover effects if 
there are any. 
 The sampling of participants should also be given some consideration. The 
sample size should be large enough to detect smaller effect sizes. To avoid sampling 
bias, self-selection of participants should be avoided if possible.  
 All in all, this master thesis could serve as a guide for further laboratory 
experiments in the research project on downstream behavioural effects of choice 
architecture manipulations, or for related research in other settings.  
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Appendix 1 
 
  
First instruction, all participants: 
 
Tack för att du deltar i vår undersökning. På bordet 
framför dig finns en konstruktionsuppgift. Tänk på 
att läsa igenom alla instruktioner noga.  
Du ska börja med att uppskatta hur lång tid du tror 
att det kommer att ta för dig att bygga ihop 
konstruktionen.  
Det är inte viktigt att göra det snabbt, bedöm bara 
hur lång tid det tar om du bygger i normal takt.  
 
Ange tiden du tror att det tar här: 
 
____min ____sek.  
 
När du har skrivit din tidsuppskattning och är redo 
att börja bygga, plinga en gång i klockan för att 
starta tidtagningen. 
När du har byggt klart plingar du två gånger i 
klockan för att stoppa tidtagningen. Du kan därefter 
öppna kuvert 2. 
2 
 
Second instruction, pro-self default condition: 
Som ett extra tack för att du deltar i vår 
undersökning ger vi dig även en bonus på 50 kr. 
Dina pengar finns i det mindre kuvertet märkt ”Till 
försöksdeltagaren”.  
 
Om du hellre vill donera pengarna till Världsnatur-
fonden WWF kan du flytta över sedeln till det 
mindre kuvertet märkt ”Till WWF”.   
 
Lägg sedan kuvertet märkt WWF i lådan. Ditt eget 
kuvert behåller du och tar med dig härifrån. Valet är 
anonymt. 
 
När du lagt i kuvertet i lådan kan du öppna kuvert 3. 
 
  
3 
 
Second instruction, pro-social default condition: 
Som ett extra tack för att du deltar i vår 
undersökning ger vi även en bonus på 50 kr, som 
kommer att doneras till Världsnaturfonden WWF för 
din räkning. Pengarna finns i det mindre kuvertet 
märkt ”Till WWF”. 
 
Om du inte vill att bonusen doneras till WWF utan 
hellre tar pengarna själv kan du flytta över sedeln till 
ditt eget mindre kuvert som är märkt ”Till 
försöksdeltagaren”.  
 
Lägg sedan kuvertet märkt WWF i lådan. Ditt eget 
kuvert behåller du och tar med dig härifrån. Valet är 
anonymt. 
 
När du lagt i kuvertet i lådan kan du öppna kuvert 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Third instruction, all participants: 
Efter undersökningens slut kommer ett pengapris att lottas 
ut till en av deltagarna. Du ska nu slå en tärning som 
avgör hur stor din vinst blir om du vinner lotteriet. 
  
Det första kastet avgör din ersättning. Slå därefter 
tärningen flera gånger till för att kontrollera att den ger ett 
rättvist resultat.  
 
Slår du en sexa får du 0 kronor om du vinner lotteriet 
Slår du en etta får du 300 kronor om du vinner lotteriet 
Slår du en tvåa får du 600 kronor om du vinner lotteriet 
Slår du en trea får du 900 kronor om du vinner lotteriet 
Slår du en fyra får du 1200 kronor om du vinner lotteriet 
Slår du en femma får du 1500 kronor om du vinner 
lotteriet 
 
När du känner dig säker på att tärningen är rättvis skriver 
du vad ditt första tärningskast visade här:  
 
____________ 
5 
 
Ange email-adress eller telefonnummer som vi kan 
kontakta dig på om du vinner 
lotteriet:_________________________ 
Om du inte vill delta i lotteriet behöver du inte ange 
kontaktuppgifter, men vi ber dig att ändå ange vad 
tärningen visade.  
 
Du är nu klar med undersökningen. Plinga tre gånger i 
klockan så kommer försöksledaren. Låt allt ligga kvar på 
bordet, utom ditt eget kuvert som du ska ta med dig. 
       
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
